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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of the UN Secretary 
General as a mediator in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. The main 
point discussed in the thesis is that the UN Secretary 
General did not have the necessary leverage to put main 
driving terms of the two parties to the negotiation table to 
be discussed. This study depends on the "Conflict Analysis 
and Resolution" literature. The background of the 1974 
Crisis is given and then evaluated in line with the adopted 
literature. The study is presented from the Turkish 
perspective. The result of the research shows that the lack 
of leverage of the Secretary General as a mediator prepared 
the ground for the termination of the conflict with the 
Turkish intervention to Cyprus. So, war provided a 
settlement of peace.
IV
ÖZET
Bu tez, 1974 Kıbrıs krizinde Birleşmiş Milletler 
Genel Sekreteri'nin arabuluculuk rolünü inceleme üzerine 
yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Tezde tartışılan başlıca konu, 
Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri'nin, krize taraf 
partilerin, başlıca ayrı düştükleri konuları, müzakere 
masasında tartışmak üzere, konuları açmaya yeterli gücünün 
olmadığıdır. Çalışma "İhtilâf Analizi ve Çözümü" teorisine 
göre hazırlanmıştır. 1974 krizini hazırlayan sebebler 
verildikten sonra, sözü geçen teoriye göre kriz 
incelenmiştir. Çalışma Türkiye'nin bakış açısını esas 
alarak hazırlanmıştır. Çalışmada varılan sonuca göre BM 
Genel Sekreteri'nin arabuluculuk görevindeki yetersizliği, 
Türk tarafının Kıbrıs'a müdahalesi ile son bulmuştur. 
Böylece barışa giden yol, savaş ile sağlanmıştır.
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CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION
From individuals' relationship to states' 
relationship the world has alw ay s witnessed 
conflicts and sometimes their resolution. So, 
one can not wonder why the "Conflict Analysis 
and Resolution" literature has gained a crucial 
place within international relations studies. 
This literature enables one to gain new 
perspectives to analyze conflicts. For this 
reason, Cyprus, which is a part of the 
international agenda for almost 32 years now, 
has been chosen as a case to focus on with the 
help of this literature.
The Cyprus conflict turned to be a crisis 
in 1974, when the Greek Junta took on the 
challenge. This study aims to elaborate the 
role of the United Nations Secretary General 
during the crisis period where he was appointed 
to conduct its "good-offices" mission.
The study depends on the "Conflict Analysis 
and Resolution" literature. However, the 
literature should be limited to a certain path 
to focus on the case. For that reason.
'mediation' and 'crisis' turned to be the key 
terms within this literature.
The 1974 Cyprus case was a crisis along the
continuum of the overall conflict. In order to
analyse the case, first, we need to know how to
evaluate a crisis according to a certain track 
in the 'conflict analysis and resolution' 
literature. The same is also valid for the 
term mediator. As a result, the case can be
examined referring to the data we obtain from 
the identification of these terms. Chapter II, 
therefore, provides a review of the
literature concerning crisis management andd 
intermediaries as a third party.
Chapter III aims at describing the 
background of the crisis. This would help the 
readers to understand the reasons why the 
parties turned the' conflict to a crisis. After 
presenting a concise crisis situation prior to 
the conflict, the crisis is elaborated in 
itself. The Cyprus crisis is divided into four 
parts in order to understand its phases. These 
phases show the way as to how the crisis can be 
resolved, either in peace or in war. The case 
in consideration points out that the resolution
was reached with the "Peace Operation" of the 
Turkish side. That means the settlement was 
reached by means of a war, when it is 
considered from the Turkish side's point of 
view.
However, the thesis aims to elaborate the 
role of the United Nations Secretary General as 
a mediator during the crisis period. Simply to 
say, the task of the UN Secretary General's 
role was to try every means to re-establish the 
broken communication between the parties to the 
conflict on the Cyprus issue, and to lead them 
to reach a settlement on the negotiation 
tables. The Secretary General is appointed to 
play his p e a c e - p r o V i d i ng task at times of a 
conflict basing on his legal right as stated in 
the UN Charter. Article 1 of the Charter says
that
maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts 
of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. (1)
To repeat once more, in case of a breach of 
communication, a mediator has to establish 
individual communication links with each of the 
parties in order to ascertain the reasons 
behind their involvement in the conflict. 
Having established and defined these reasons, 
the mediator, then has to re-establish t r i ­
lateral communication links between the parties 
in order to facilitate qualified concessions. 
These concessions can then lead to a resolution 
of the crisis acceptable by both sides. A 
successful mediator, who is good at timing, 
information, and leverage, can provide a good 
communication link between the adversaries. If 
the mediator is able to persuade the parties to 
negotiate and continue with this process, then 
one may expect qualified concessions acceptable 
to them and issued by each other. These 
concessions can then be the sources of peaceful 
and long lasting solution to their problem.
Finally, the last chapter tries to 
underline the results of the study.
"CONFLICT
LITERATURE
CHAPTER II. CRISIS AND MEDIATION IN THE 
ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION"
2.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT
2.1.1 CRISIS
The term 'crisis' took its place in the 
theoretical literature in the aftermath of the 
Cuban Missile crisis (1962) during which Me 
Ñamara the US. Secretary of Defense, declared 
that "there is no longer any such thing as 
strategy, only crisis management." (1)
Several definitions of the term crisis 
have been made in the literature. Charles 
Hermann defines a crisis as a situation which
should threaten the main interests of a state
where the policy makers of the concerned state 
have a short time to formulate a policy and 
where there is an element of surprise. (2) 
Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, in their book 
C o n f1 i c t_Among_Nat ions define crisis as.
a sequence of interactions 
between the governments of two
or more sovereign states in 
severe conflict, short of
actual war, but involving the
perception of a dangerously 
high probability of w a r . (3)
Coral Bell traces the word "crisis" to its 
Greek derivation to mean simply a 'decision
point' or 'turning point' of an illness. (4) 
For other analysts, the term denotes an event 
or situation that is confined within a much 
shorter period of time, and is measured in days 
or weeks rather than years. At the core of
these definitions there are three common
e 1ement s :
(a) A perception of threat to high- 
priority goals;
(b) A shortage of time in which to 
formulate responses;
(c) A high probability of an escalation in 
v i o l e n c e .
In fact, crises arise out of conflicts, but
they are easier to study than conflicts as 
they can be isolated from normal interactions
as opposed to conflicts. A crisis has a life 
cycle of its own. A crisis begins, grows, and 
then dies. Bell states in his study. The
Conventions_Q-f_Crisis that.
the essence of true crisis in
any given relationship is that
the conflicts within it rise to 
a level which threatens to
transform the nature of the 
relationship. . . The concept is 
of normal strain rising to the
level of breaking strain. (5)
So, crises lie at the crucial threshold 
between peace and war. The actors may 
transform with being first allies then becoming 
adversaries, or there may be relatively minimal 
changes in actors' relationship as a result.
Young considers these possibilities
defines crisis as;
a process of interaction
occurring at higher levels of 
perceived intensity than the 
ordinary flow of events and
characterized by: a sharp break
from the ordinary flow of 
politics; a rise in the
perceived prospects that
violence will break out; and 
significant implications for
the stability of some system or 
subsystem (or pattern of
relationship) in international
politics. (6)
He
2.1.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT
'Management' is defined as control in the 
Oxford Dictionary. Crisis management aims to
control crises so that war does not break out
through a series of participants'
miscalculations and mistakes. Phil Williams
describes crisis management as follows:
crisis management is concerned 
on the one hand with the 
procedures for controlling and 
regulating a crisis so that it 
does not get out of hand and 
lead to war, and on the other
with ensuring that the crisis 
is resolved on a satisfactory 
basis in which the vital 
interests of the state are
secured and protected. The
second aspect will almost 
invariably necessitate vigorous 
actions carrying substantial 
risks. One task of crisis
management, therefore, is to 
temper these risks, to keep 
them as low and as controllable 
as possible, while the other is 
to ensure that the coercive 
diplomacy and risk-taking
tactics are as effective as 
possible in gaining concessions 
from the adversary and
maintaining one's own position 
relatively intact. (6)
In a crisis situation, each state therefore 
attempts to seek what is in its best interest. 
Each has certain goals or objectives which it 
strives to at. tain, and these goals and 
objectives contradict mostly with adversaries' 
interests. Joseph Bouchard interprets this 
situation as, "a crisis is fundamentally a 
bargaining relationship between the two 
s i d e s " . (7) Each party to the conflict, 
characterized by interdependence, forces the 
other to take into consideration others'
decisions, actions, and objectives when 
formulating its own policy. This action-
reaction process between states entails a great 
degree of risk, because parties purposefully 
raise their own risk levels in order to reach 
their goals or objectives by the end of the 
crisis .
2.1.3 CRISIS STRUCTURE
To repeat, a crisis has a life-cycle. It 
begins, grows, and dies. Crisis is a phase 
along the continuum of a conflict. But it does 
not bring one to its management. It only shows 
that the conflict has reached a stalemate and 
it will be resolved either by war or with 
acceptable concessions by the parties to the 
c o n f l i c t .
Crisis has a time scale in the overall 
conflict. The conflicting issues do not arise 
at once. The parties negotiate in order to 
reach a settlement of their dispute, and during 
these negotiations they bargain in a certain 
manner. A conflict turns out to be a crisis 
with the realization of a challenge. The 
challenge is motivated by a precipitant 
attempt. This attempt gives rise to a change;
it may concern national security, economic 
viability, territorial integrity or similar 
factors. This is then followed up to a 
resistance point. This resistance point stands 
for a situation where there is no more 
alternatives of bargaining. This is related to 
adversaries' ranges of bargaining. The parties 
reach a point where there would be no more 
c o n c e s s i o n s . (8) The resistance point is this 
point, and the conflict turns into a crisis. 
So, crises in general follow the confrontation 
process. In the complicated confrontation 
process, the negotiators try to maintain 
control over the events and risks associated 
with crisis. Bell argues that time pressures, 
stress, and lack of complete information 
available to decision makers during crisis 
situations make rational and calculated 
decisions d i f f i c u l t . (9) While this is true, 
the availability of recognizable tools or 
techniques enhances states' ability to cope and 
manage crisis situations. Brecher outlines a 
number of tools available to this end. These 
include, "verbal, political, economic, n o n ­
violent military and violent" o n e s . (10) The 
objective in the use of these tools is to 
communicate a message of resolve and commitment
10
to the adversary. Bell, using a different 
terminology, groups both verbal and non-verbal 
communiqués as 'signals' . (11) Examples of 
signals range from diplomacy to sanctions, the 
invoking of international law and the movement 
of one's military forces. These tools, a state 
chooses reflect the degree of state interest in 
the crisis at hand. Is the issue of vital 
strategic importance to the state in question? 
To what degree is it willing to go in order to 
secure or preserve its interests? Or is it an 
issue in which it is willing to make 
concessions? These are all questions decision 
makers face when they formulate a policy in 
response to a crisis situation.
The mainstream trend in the literature of 
crisis management views the avoidance of war as 
the ultimate goal. Yet, in many respects it is 
restrictive in nature, as it necessitates that 
both or all parties to crisis place a high 
value on the avoidance of war. But both going 
to war and reaching an agreement make up crisis 
management .
11
2.2.1. THE INTERMEDIARY
The theoretical base of the thesis is found
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ' . Little attention has been
paid to third parties as intermediaries, 
because modern theories of international 
relations have emerged in response to relations 
between superpowers and their competition for 
spheres of influence. Christopher Mitchell
explains the term 'intermediaries' as
third parties that intervene 
diplomatically in a conflict by
the consent of both parties
with the intention of achieving 
some compromise settlement of 
the issues at stake between the
parties, or at least ending
disruptive conflict behavior 
indulged in by both sides. (12)
Intermediaries become strikingly active 
when the context is other than superpower 
relations. Today, small states, international 
organizations, and a variety of transnational 
actors regularly intervene in crises. They do 
not change the balance of power nor do they 
impose solutions, but they do intervene to 
change state affairs. What may be most
distinguishing is that intermediaries must gain 
parties' acceptance or consent. Second,
2.2 INTERMEDIARIES AS A THIRD PARTY
12
influence by intermediaries, large or small, 
state or non-state, entails more subtle 
processes than the use of threat or force. It 
may involve offers of aid or simply the 
appropriation of decisions about negotiating 
procedures. (13)
2.2.2 NEGOTIATION BY AN INTERMEDIARY
An intermediary's intervention can be 
considered as one of the main forms of 
negotiation. Some negotiations are direct and 
bilateral. Others are multilateral where one 
member 'mediates' in the sense of bringing the 
others together to form a coalition. In such 
coalition bargaining, all parties in 
multilateral negotiations are potential 
mediators, but they are neither "in between" 
nor intermediaries. (14)
Briefly, intermediaries are actors with 
incentives to get involved, but without direct 
interests in the disputed issues. They may 
provide just enough incentives to settle the 
dispute or, to put it more subtly, just enough 
change in perceptions and attitudes to tip the 
balance from a contentious to a cooperative
13
approach to resolve the dispute. The 
difference they make is not so much between who 
wins and who loses or how much is gained and 
lost, rather, it is between settling early 
rather than late or between trying one more 
round at the negotiating table rather than 
initiating hostilities or between searching for 
the common denominators for negotiations, rather 
than getting tied up with the preconditions of 
negotiations. When the settlement of a 
conflict moves between violent and peaceful, 
and when the settlement of a conflict moves 
from seemingly minor questions of procedure and 
saving face, intermediaries can push the 
parties toward conciliatory approaches 
sometimes gently and unobtrusively, sometimes 
with concrete inducements.
2.2.3
INTEREST
THE TYPES OF AN INTERMEDIARY
The intermediary can be distinguished by 
examining the nature of its interests 
Princen has identified two types of
intermediaries depending on the nature of their 
interests. If the intermediary has no interest 
whatsoever in the disputed issues -direct or
14
but simply wants to facilitate an 
agreement, it is a "neutral mediator". If the 
intermediary has no direct interest in the 
issue but does have indirect interests, like 
security concerns in the region, it is a 
"principal mediator" and it also has the 
resources to bring to bear. (15)
United Nations, which is the focus of this 
study, by being an intermediary party to 
resolve the conflict of Cyprus, is a "principal 
mediator". The organization's major purposes 
are stated in Article 1 of the United Nations
Charter as follows:
To maintain international peace 
and s e curity... and to bring 
about by peaceful means and in 
conformity with the principles 
of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement 
of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to 
a breach of the peace." (16)
Chapter VI, regarding "The Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes", obligates the parties 
to a conflict or dispute "likely to endanger... 
international peace and security" to submit it 
to some procedure for pacific settlement, 
whether negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to some regional agency, or any other 
method the parties can devise. (17)
15
2.2.4 PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR
For the principal mediator, the main 
concern of intervention is the payoff structure 
and the intervention objective is to enhance 
incentives for agreement. A principal mediator
bargains with each disputant on the issues in
which it has indirect interests, that is, 
indirect to the disputant's originally disputed 
issues. At least three bargaining dynamics are
possible: First, the mediator can bargain
directly with a disputant to strike a side 
deal. Second, it can form a coalition with one
disputant to compel a concession from the other
disputant. Finally, it can create a three-way
circular bargaining in which the mediator makes
a deal with one disputant, who makes a deal 
with the mediator to complete the circle. One
effect on the disputants is to expand agreement 
alternatives. In the end, the original dispute
may be settled almost as a by-product of these
various bargaining combinations.
2.2.5 BARGAINING STRUCTURE OF A PRINCIPAL
MEDIATOR
The principal mediator's intervention, 
fundamentally changes the bargaining dynamics
16
and structure. The bargaining is no longer 
direct and bilateral, but it is a three-way 
bargaining, because the mediator is primarily 
concerned with the dynamics of side deals, 
coalitions, and circular deal-making, whereby 
the disputants' bilateral negotiation becomes 
secondary. Of course, part of what is at stake 
in the two parallel bargaining with the 
mediator is the issues in dispute between the 
original disputants. However the focus of the 
bargaining, and the character of interaction, 
shifts from direct bilateral bargaining 
(between disputants) to parallel bilateral 
bargaining and circular three-way bargaining 
(among disputants and mediator) . Much of the 
bargaining on the original dispute thus becomes 
indirect bargaining through the mediator. 
Therefore, one consequence of this kind of 
intervention is that it detracts from the 
disputants' direct interactions. (18)
2.2.6 ACTIONS AND BARGAINING STRATEGY OF 
THE PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR
Mediator's role and tasks are extremely 
complex, and the mediator's initiatives and 
bargaining strategies vary greatly from case to
17
case. Intervention ranges from passing
messages between the parties to active 
engagement in the bargaining and attempts to 
place pressure on the antagonists to accept 
peace proposals that the mediator has 
formulated. The activities of the third party 
may thus vary along several dimensions, such as
forma1 ity-informa1i t y , extensiveness of
resources committed, directness of penetration 
into bargaining, and the identity of the 
conflict. Young, first lists mediator's
actions, taken to help the opponents begin or
continue bilateral discussions, or to help 
implement any agreements already reached.
Here, the intermediary does not become involved
in the essential bargaining. The list includes 
'good offices', 'data source', 'interposition', 
and 'supervision' . For the purposes of this 
study, 'good offices mission', which is the 
role that United Nations Secretary-G enera1 
appointed to the Cyprus issue by the UN 
Security Council, will be discussed. Second, 
Young lists the bargaining strategies that a 
mediator adopts, which are: 'persuasion',
'enunciation', 'elaboration and initiation' and
'participation'. Again for our purposes, we 
shall discuss 'elaboration and initiation' as a
18
bargaining strategy. That is, one is for 
providing a good communication channel, then, 
for the continuation of this established 
communication. The aim of this strategy is to 
reach qualified concessions.
2.2.7 BARGAINING RANGE
When the bargaining range, which is the set
of agreement points that both sides prefer over
their no-agreement alternatives is markedly 
skewed toward the more powerful disputant, the 
intermediary is inclined to rectify the 
imbalance and to propose a solution that is 
"fair". However, a fair solution from the
perspective of the status quo is likely to be
different from a fair solution from the 
perspective of reservation values, i.e. the 
values for which bargaining is impossible. If 
the intermediary chooses a status quo based on
the fairness principle, the solution may, in 
fact, be less than the powerful side's 
reservation value. Fearing such a possibility, 
at least intuitively, the powerful disputant 
may resist an intervention altogether.
19
A fair solution suggested by an 
intermediary can thus thwart acceptance. The 
powerful disputant, aware of this dilemma, may 
try to convince the intermediary of its true 
reservation value that is the value of each 
party's no agreement alternative. In essence, 
the mediator tries especially to convert the 
bargaining structure from a win-lose position 
to a win-win position.
Acceptance may also be facilitated if the 
disputant chooses an intervener with a 
demonstrated interest in simply getting an 
agreement, not necessarily one committed to 
getting a fair agreement. A high-profile 
intervener, one in need of public success, may 
be better, in this case, for both disputant's 
and an equity -or efficiency- oriented 
i nt e r v e n o r .
20
CHAPTER III. 
CRISIS
EVALUATION OF THE 1 974 CYPRUS
3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS
The negotiations started between Tu r k e y and 
Greece as a result of the failure of the Greek 
Government. The Greek side was unable to 
acquire a decision regarding one-sided self- 
determination right (meaning enosis) from the 
United Nations.
Turkey, certainly, was very decisive on 
giving support to Turkish Cypriots. The 
Turkish side was claiming equal communal rights 
for the two communities living on the island.
In February 1959, representatives of 
Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriot communities 
met with representatives of the British 
government in London. The British Government 
agreed to transfer the sovereignty of the 
island to the Turkish and Greek communities of 
Cyprus under partnership terms which these two 
ethnic communities, Turkey, and Greece had 
agreed upon.
21
The agreement made clear that there is no 
Cypriot nation and Cypriot Turks and Greeks 
had always lived and prospered as two 
independent ethnic communities; always 
jealously guarding their national and communal 
identity with separate languages, customs, 
culture, historical heritage and religion. (2) 
The compromise solution of the Zurich and 
London Agreements, was reached on the basis of 
a bi-national independence, resting on 
political equality and administrative 
partnership of the two communities, who were 
given full autonomy in what were strictly 
defined as communal affairs. The settlement 
thus established was to be guaranteed by 
Turkey, Greece, and Britain, thus ensuring the 
permanence of the Cyprus Republic and assuring 
both sides that peace would be maintained on 
the i s l a n d . (3)
This framework has multiple dimensions. 
First, a Constitution proposed "functional 
federation". Second, a treaty of Guarantee 
guaranteed the situation caused by the articles 
of this treaty. Third, Treaty of Establishment 
left two sovereign military bases to England. 
And, fourth. Treaty of Alliance provided the 
existence of Greek and Turkish military
22
contingents on Cyprus. On August 16, 1960 the
Cyprus Republic was officially established.
The arrangements of 1 9 6 0 aimed at a 
domestic balance with a functional partnership
between the two communities. The Constitution 
of the Cyprus Republic, established by the 
Treaty, was accepted through negotiations 
between the interested parties. In this
respect, it was agreed not to have any changes
in major principles. But by the collapse of
the Constitution caused by the Greek Cypriot 
violation of constitutional measures, the 
"Treaty of Establishment" became invalid since 
1960. Since then, the balance has been ensured 
through the guarantorship of Greece, Turkey, 
and England. Turkey, in this manner, put the 
whole island under guarantee including the 
English sovereign bases of Agratur and Dikelya.
Greece had used its guarantorship right in a 
negative manner by pursuing 'Enosis' . Thus,
England had visualized its guarantor right not 
as an obligation, but only as a right by 
staying silent in the face of the Greek Cypriot
terrorism. In response to this, the Turkish 
side has provided peace and stability on the
island determined by its right of
guarant orship . Within this balance, it was
23
planned that Greece and Turkey will not reach 
an advantageous position over each other. In 
the light of this, for example, it was accepted
in these years that, Cyprus could not be a 
member of the European Union unless Turkey
becomes a member.
The Greek Cypriot side seemed to have no 
intention of allowing the resultant
Constitution to persist. The campaign for
Enosis was further intensified, and Greek 
Cypriot leader Makarios made no secret of his 
intention to amend the Constitution at any 
cost. Many of the 1960 Constitution principles 
that protected Turkish Cypriots' rights of
partnership, were not being adopted. For
example, the Turkish Cypriots were not employed
at a rate of 30%. The appointments to foreign 
representations were not either made after 
reaching an agreement with the vice-president, 
who was Turkish. In addition, the EOKA members
were allowed to attend both the Council of 
Ministers and public staff. The Cyprus army 
which would be composed of 20000 troops in 
which the Turkish Cypriots would participate at 
a rate of %40 was never established. The
principles of the Constitution related to the 
different municipalities and the announcement
24
of this decision by Makarios was never 
realized. These can be counted as major
e X amp 1e s .
Makarios claimed that the Zurich and London
Agreements had given rights beyond a
justifiable end to the Turkish Cypriots, and 
argued that the 1960 Constitution was not 
working any more. On 30 November 1 9 63,
Makarios confronted the Turkish wing of the 
Cyprus government with a proposal for thirteen
amendments, which he must have known in advance
would not be accepted. Seven out of these
articles, were seeking the amendment of the 
unchangeable fundamental principles such as 
altering the 4 0 - 6 0 ratio in the Cypriot army. 
These amendments were rejected by the Turkish 
side on 16 December 1963.
On 21 December 1963, Archbishop Makarios 
authorized the formation of a militia to carry 
out a planned program of action known as the
'Akritas Plan'. As a result, 30000 Turkish 
Cypriots were forced to leave their villages 
which numbered 103. The entire population of 
the Turkish Cypriots were living within 
enclaves covering 3% of the island. The
Turkish Cypriots, living within enclaves over 
the whole island, were suffering from the
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economic blockade applied by the Greek Cypriots 
supported by foreign powers, and the violation 
of human rights by the Greek Cypriot militia. 
The arrival of the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Force on the island in the first half of 1964, 
did not change the situation. Greece secretly 
sent 20.000 troops to the island. This 
completely changed the structure of the Cyprus 
Republic; it turned to be a Greek Cypriot 
Republic rather than being a Republic based on 
T u r k i s h -Greek Cypriot partnership. The two 
communities were separated.
These were given an end through a limited 
operation by Turkey in 1964. Turkey also 
started to give support for the establishment 
of Turk Mucahit Teskilati (TMT- Turkish 
counterpart of the EOKA) at that time and it 
also supported the Turkish Cypriot Government 
financially. The Turkish Cypriot villages of 
Kophinou (Gecitkale) and Ayios Theodoros 
(Boğaziçi) were attacked by 20.000 men from 
mainland Greece. This brought Turkey and 
Greece to the brink of war and Turkey's 
decisiveness on using its guarantor right led 
the Greeks to withdraw their troops from the 
island.
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3.2 EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS PERIOD
3.2.1 PRE-CRISIS PERIOD: JULY 15- JULY 19
19 7 4
On July 2 1974, Makarios sent to Greek
President General Phaidon Gizikis and set free 
to press a harsh and provocative letter 
accusing the junta of masterminding the
campaign of terror in Cyprus. He wrote;
"Mr. President,
With deep sorrow I am 
obliged to bring to your 
attention certain unacceptable 
incidents and situations in 
Cyprus for which I consider the
Greek Government responsible."
Makarios then started to list certain 
a c c u s a t i o n s ;
a. the Greek government had
sent Grivas to Cyprus to 
organize EOKA-B,
b. the G r e e k -officered
National Guard supported EOKA-B 
with men and supplies,
c. the military camps were
decorated with a n t i -government
and pro-EOKA posters,
d. the a n t i -goVernment
press in Cyprus was financed 
and guided by the Greek C.I.A.,
e. the mastermind behind
the situation was within the 
Greek regime itself,
f . the rebellion of the 
Greek Cypriot bishops was a 
result of encouragement by the
Greek government.
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g. the leadership of the 
National Guard, on instruction 
from Athens ignored the 
legitimate demand of the Cyprus 
government to approve the list 
of prospective recruits for 
officer training,
h. the National Guard was 
an organ of the Cypriot State 
and should not be arbitrarily 
controlled by the Athens 
G o vernment,
i. the only solution to 
this unacceptable situation was 
that all of the 6 5 0 Greek 
officers leave Cyprus.
Makarios ended his letter by stressing that 
he had no intention of disrupting cooperation 
between the Greek and Cyprus Governments, but 
at the same time he reminded the Greek 
Government, as he put it, that, "I am not an 
appointed provincial governor of Greece but an 
elected leader of a large part of Hellenism and 
I demand an analogous treatment by the 
'National Center'."
What Makarios was expecting in response to 
this letter was that the loannides regime would 
give in to his demands. Perhaps, he even hoped 
to force it out of office, thereby he would not 
only save his political life but also he would 
rid the Greeks of a hated tyranny. But the 
Junta took on the challenge. It ordered the 
National Guard to seize power and kill 
M a k a r i o s .
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On 15 July 1 974, the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry received a note from the Turkish 
Embassy in Nicosia around 8.30 a.m., informing 
that; "it has been learnt that a coup d'état 
has been initiated against Makarios." This was 
not an expected development and Prime Minister 
Ecevit was immediately informed about the 
development. By that time, they got another 
telegram informing the death of Makarios.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry was already 
uneasy after the letter sent to Gizikis from 
Makarios on July 2, 1974. It sensed that there 
was something going wrong between the junta and 
Makarios .
In the afternoon of the same day, the EOKA 
killer Nikos Sampson was installed as 
'President' in Makarios's place. The news that 
Makarios was still alive was confirmed. 
Sampson was purely 'Enosist'.
The Turkish Council of Ministers met at 
19:30 p.m. that day and Prime Minister Ecevit 
mentioned at his speech that;
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Article 4 of the Guarantor 
Agreement which was designed 
for the independence of Cyprus 
must start to run and the new 
leader Sampson must be
overthrown. The Turkish
soldiers' existence on the 
island is necessary. We can
only protect Turkey's and
Turkish-C y priots' interests in 
this way. The preparations for
the intervention must start.
By this time, we should talk 
with the other Guarantor State 
England, to solve the crisis 
without fighting. If we are
not able to get a satisfactory 
answer from the other Guarantor 
State - England - then we will 
complete all the preparations 
to intervene in Cyprus.
By the end of this meeting, the Council of 
Ministers, gave Prime Minister Ecevit "full 
authority" in this crisis. Prime Minister
Ecevit was to try every means to persuade 
England to side with Turkey both politically
and economically, but he knew that England 
would not accept such a policy. Thus, the
Turkish government and the General Staff of the
Turkish Army had all agreed that July 20, 1974
- Saturday was exactly the 'Intervention Day' .
The Secretary of United States of America -
Kissinger was pursuing a policy of 'wait-and-
see' . Kissinger was not referring to
Makarios's government but he was waiting for 
the Sampson government to replace him. Turkish
Prime Minister Ecevit perceived this strategy
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as; if they lose time, America would recognize 
the Sampson government.
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit decided that 
his strategy would be to go to England to
persuade them to join Turkey in a military
operation to preserve the independence of
Cyprus, using their rights according to the
Article 4 of the Guarantor Agreement. This
would show his good wishes to solve the crisis
peacefully. And he would not mention any word 
of the plans of the 'Turkish Peace Operation' .
English Government made a notice that they 
would welcome Turkish Prime Minister, but they 
did not specify a time. They said that they
very well understood Turkey's point of view in 
the evaluation of the crisis and for that
reason they put pressure on Athens.
The same day a ship left from Greece 
Piraeus, carrying 650 officials to Cyprus and 
this would mean, a change in the balance of the
forces. The English Government was making
offers for the withdrawal of the troops of the
Junta in Cyprus. So, this would definitely end 
with the satisfaction of the Turkish 
Government .
In the light of these developments. Prime 
Minister Ecevit flew to England without waiting
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an invitation. He met English Prime Minister 
Wilson and English Foreign Minister Callaghan. 
In this meeting, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit 
reminded them of the right of the guarantor 
states under Article 4 to preserve the 
independence of Cyprus. He also explained them 
the need for a Turkish intervention and asked 
for their participation. However, the English 
side believed that the crisis could be solved 
through diplomatic means - through 
negotiations. English Prime Minister Wilson 
informed Prime Minister Ecevit that the special 
representative of the Secretary of State, 
Kissinger, was requesting a meeting with him. 
This act was an open signal to express that 
England did not want to take any position or 
responsibility in the crisis rather it 
preferred to be replaced by United States of 
Arne r i c a .
Prime Mini.ster Ecevit met Kissinger's 
special representative Sisco at the Turkish 
Embassy in London. Sisco requested from Prime 
Minister Ecevit to write down Turkey's demand 
to end this crisis peacefully on an agreeable 
basis and he said that he would negotiate these 
demands by the Athens government.
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The Turkish government's demands were as 
f o l l o w s  ;
1- The Turkish troops existence on the
island should be accepted for the security of
the independence and security of the Turkish-
Cypriots .
2- Sampson should be immediately
o v e r t h r o w n .
3- The Turkish-Cypriots should be permitted
to have a land which has transit to sea.
4- A security system should be established
for the arrivals and departures from Cyprus.
Broadly speaking, the Turkish side's 
demands were aimed to provide equal rights for
the two communities living on the island, 
namely Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.
Prime Minister Ecevit returned to Turkey on
19 July 1 9 7 4 and went directly to the General
Staff and reconfirmed that the "Peace 
Operation" would start early next morning. 
That is, Turkish Prime Minister gave the order
for the intervention to the island to preserve
peace, security and order in the island. On 
the other side, this act could reveal a 
probability of a war between Greece and Turkey. 
The special representative of Kissinger 
Sisco, went to Athens in order to negotiate
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Turkish demands, but he was only able to speak 
to loannides who did not believe that Turkey
would intervene in Cyprus. The negotiations 
did not end successfully for Sisco. When he 
came to Ankara, he said that the Greek 
government accepted to withdraw the troops 
attended the coup by the Junta and continued
that they might be helpful in the overthrow of
Sampson. He also said that elections would be 
made on the island within one year and nothing
would happen to the Tu r k i s h - Cy p r i o t s on the 
i s l a n d .
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's response to 
these answers was very clear. He said that 
they would take the dead bodies away and bring
living ones to the island and this will not be
an acceptable and agreeable solution. In
response to this, Sisco increased his pressure 
on Ecevit and broadly said that in case of a
T u r k i s h -Greek war, Turkey would be alone.
3-2.2 MID-CRISIS PERIOD: JULY 20
24, 1974
JULY
Early in the morning of 20 July 1 9 7 4 the
'Peace Operation' started. At 06.10 a.m. Prime 
Minister Ecevit made an announcement from the
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radio to the world, 
words ;
He said the following
This is not an invasion, but an
act against invasion;
This is not aggression, but an 
act to end aggression.
We are there to help you, not
t o hu r t .
We are there with love, not 
hate.
We are there not to fight you
but to end your plight.
AtAnd the 'Peace Operation' started.
10:30 a .m . Greek Foreign Minister Kiprios, 
called the Ambassador of Turkey to Athens, 
Gurun. The Greek Foreign Minister forwarded
the first ultimatum to Turkey:
Immediately stop the invasion 
and withdraw your soldiers from
the island. We permit you till
16.00 p.m. If it is not done,
Greece can not be held
responsible from the
d e v elopments.
Gurun 
answer 
It is too late.
The Turkish Ambassador to Athens, 
gave a very clear and concrete 
immediately. He said that; '
You should have thought this before. Your
offers cannot be met in 2 hours or 2 days."
The 'Peace Operation' was continuing, but 
there was a surprise to the Turkish troops who 
landed on the island. They met with a heavy 
unexpected opposition from the Greek-Cypx'iots .
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The G r e e k -Cypriots were militarily superior in 
terms of both quality and quantity.
The United Nations Security Council passed
a Resolution (353) so quickly for the first 
time. The reason of this quickness was, the 
two superpowers had reached an agreement on the
issue; America did not want to have a Turco-
Greek war, and Soviet Union did not want to see
the expansion of Turkey.
On 24 July a cease-fire was declared.
3.2.3 CEASE-FIRE AND GENEVA CONFERENCES: 
JULY 25-AUGUST 13 1974
The first Geneva Conference was opened, 
only two days after the return of democratic 
rule to Greece on 25 July 1974. Turkey, Greece
and Britain were represented by their Foreign
Ministers Turan Gunes, George Mavros and James 
Callaghan. America had sent an observer
Assistant Secretary of State, William Buffum, 
to the Conference.
Greek Foreign Minister Mavros announced the
next day that unless Turkey agreed to withdraw 
its forces to the 22 July cease-fire fronts, 
Greece would abandon the conference. The 
Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes responded by
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that the Greek forces, too, had 
extended their occupation area and added that 
"Unless the cease-fire is accepted by everybody 
in all parts of the island. . . I can assume no 
responsibility on behalf of the Turkish Forces 
in Cyprus."
The negotiations reached an impasse over 
the issue of the violations of the 22 July 
cease-fire on 27 July 1 974. At this stage 
Secretary of State Kissinger intervened, 
talking with Ecevit and Karamanlis by 
telephone. Within one day Kissinger succeeded 
in persuading both parties to adopt a new 
cease-fire line which acknowledged the 
respective expansions of both Greek and Turkish 
forces .
Except for its recognition of Resolution 
353, Turkey made no compromises in Geneva. The 
same was not true for Greece. Greek Foreign 
Minister Mavros opposed some of the Turkish 
demands but eventually accepted most of them. 
The Geneva Declarations signed on July 30, 1974 
by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece, and 
Britain linked Turkey's withdrawal of its 
forces from Cyprus to the achievement of "a 
just and lasting solution acceptable to all 
parties concerned." Britain and Greece thus
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lent their recognition to the military presence 
of Turkey on Cyprus. They also acknowledged 
that Turkey had a legitimate right to occupy 
part of the island until such time as a new 
constitutional order was established.
After the first Geneva Conference, Turkey 
continued to reinforce its troops on the 7% of 
Cyprus under its control. The Greek Cypriot 
National Guard still occupied Turkish enclaves 
on other parts of the island despite the fact 
that the Geneva Declaration required their 
immediate evacuation. The National Guard, 
still dominated by the mainland Greek officers 
believed that its control of Turkish enclaves 
was the only factor holding back the Turkish 
army from continuing its expansion.
Within a week after the Geneva Declaration, 
Prime Minister Ecevit began officially 
suggesting that he desired a territorial 
federation in Cyprus.
Glafcos Klerides, the new 'President of 
Cyprus' , who replaced Sampson after the 
latter's resignation on 23 July 1974 stated 
that he did not believe that "the idea of 
federation is feasible, on the basis, in any 
case, of geographically homogenous territories, 
because this would imply the transfer of tens
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of thousands of people..." Instead Klerides 
argued that a unitary state which granted 
"local autonomy" to Turkish Cypriots should be 
established. The reluctance of Greek Cypriots 
to consider a settlement based on territorial 
federation led to Turkey to decide to initiate 
the "Second Peace Operation".
Meanwhile the Ecevit Government had 
concluded that at the Second Geneva Conference, 
Turkey should insist on the negotiation of a 
new Cyprus settlement, preferably a bi-zonal 
federation. The Government also decided that 
if the Greeks refused to accept the principle 
of a federative solution and tried to 
procrastinate, the Turkish delegation should 
withdraw from the conference and Turkey should 
achieve its goal by resuming its offensive in 
C y p r u s .
The chances for a peaceful settlement 
looked very dim on August 9, 1 97 4 when the 
Geneva Conference opened. Upon his arrival 
Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Gunes maintained 
that despite the clear stipulation of the 
Geneva Declaration, the Greek forces had not 
yet evacuated the Turkish enclaves. Greek 
Foreign Minister Mavros, replied that Turkey,
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too, violated the Geneva Declaration by 
extending its zone of occupation by 30 k m ^ .
On August 1 0 1 9 7 4, the second day of the
Conference, Klerides offered the position of 
vice-presidency to Denktas and a return to the
1960 Constitution. Denktas replied:
For eleven years, the Greeks 
have tried and did all they 
could do to destroy the 1960 
Constitution. . . .Now we are
invited to go back to the 1960
Constitution. This is
impossible, that constitution
did not save the Turks, did not
save Cyprus, has given no 
prot ect ion .
The same day, Denktas submitted the 
T u r k i s h /Turki sh-Cypriot settlement proposal to 
British Foreign Secretary Callaghan who 
transmitted it privately to the Greek and Greek 
Cypriot delegations. The Turkish proposal
offered the establishment of a bi-zonal federal 
state that would provide a great deal of 
autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek 
Delegations almost immediately rejected the 
proposal. Both the proposal and its rejection 
were informal and took place not in plenary 
sessions but in private meeting rooms.
At this stage Kissinger intervened once 
more by calling Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit 
and suggested to him that even though he
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understood the Turkish-Cypriots needs for more 
territory and more autonomy, he believed that
these goals should be accomplished through 
negotiations. During the telephone
conversation which took place on August 12, 
1974, Kissinger maintained that he felt 
Klerides would be more willing to accept a 
cantonal rather than a federal settlement on 
Cyprus. The same day. Prime Minister Ecevit 
discussed the offer with the National Security 
Council and they agreed to offer a cantonal 
solution to the Greeks, but were unwilling for
its ratification.
Meanwhile, Callaghan told Klerides that he
was in constant dialogue with Kissinger and 
that Kissinger had told him that he would not 
exert any further pressure on Turkey in order
to prevent a second operation. Callaghan added 
that Britain was ready to use its forces in 
Cyprus to prevent Turkey's expansion and this
was favored by both America and United Nations. 
Callaghan assumed that since Kissinger would 
not approve a British intervention Klerides 
would have no alternative but to accept 
Turkey's thesis for a federation. He concluded 
that if Klerides did so, then Kissinger and he
could put pressure on Turkey to limit the
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Turkish Cypriot zone to 20 to 22 percent of 
Cyprus. Klerides refused this.
On August 13, 1974 the Turkish Delegation
decided that it was time to publicly propose
its two different plans to Greece. At the
plenary session on August 13,1974, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Gunes repeated Turkey's 
proposals and urged Mavros and Klerides to give
a final answer. Klerides replied that he could 
give a definite answer only if he had an 
additional 48 hours to consider the proposals.
Gunes who believed that the Greeks had no 
intention of accepting a negotiated solution
and were only trying to gain time. It seems
Klerides thought that time was on their side
and if the negotiations lasted long enough, 
international pressure on Turkey would make it
increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue a
policy of 'black-mail'.
The G r e e k -Cypriots objectives were as 
fo l l o w s ;
1- to gain time since the more time that
elapsed the more difficult it would be for 
Turkey to attack again;
2- to mobilize international opinion and 
try to influence Anglo-American policy towards 
firm acceptance of the view that since
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constitutional legitimacy had been restored 
hostilities had to end and meaningful 
negotiations be resumed;
3- try to conduct any negotiations not on 
the basis of geographical separation but on the 
lines of integral and bi-communal state.
Klerides was lacking a political base in 
Cyprus. He knew that if he accepted the 
federation settlement, neither Sampson's nor 
Makarios's supporters would stand by him. 
Hence, Klerides chose to procrastinate on the 
negotiations with the belief that losing 
territory in a second peace operation of Turkey 
would have fewer disadvantages than abandoning 
the same territory through an agreement. The 
resumption of Turkey's offensive, he expected, 
would isolate Turkey internationally and 
contribute to the Greek cause.
By August 13, 1 9 7 4 the Turks became 
convinced that the continuation of the 
negotiations would bring no favorable results 
and that the second operation, which from the 
beginning had been considered an integral part 
of the Turkish strategy, would be made. The 
Turks knew that international public opinion 
was slowly turning against them and that if 
they were going to do something, they must do
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it quickly. The Ecevit government also feared 
that the Soviet and American stances might 
change in the long run and Turkish Cypriots 
could be forced to content themselves with the 
seven percent of the island that Turkey 
c o n t r o l l e d .
Before giving the start of the second peace 
operation, Ecevit offered Greek Prime Minister 
Karamanlis another way out of the deadlock. 
According to this 'last alternative', Ecevit 
wanted the Greeks to demilitarize the area 
around the Turkish forces who occupied 7% of 
Cyprus territory. After this evacuation, 
Turkey would extend its control toward 
Famagusta on the eastern shore, thus seizing 
17-18% of the island's territory. This would 
save 10.000 Turк ish-Cypriоts in Serdarli, and 
another 10.000 in Famagusta. Ecevit told 
Kissinger that if the Greeks accepted this 
'interim' solution, he would postpone the 
negotiations not only for 48 hours but for 
several weeks.
By the end of the day, Ecevit was convinced 
that Turkey would not be able to achieve a 
favorable settlement unless it once again acted 
"assertively". Ecevit suggested that;
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once their prestige had been 
restored after the fall of the 
Junta, the Greeks thought that 
they could take advantage of 
the hopes concerning the new 
regime by mobilizing Western 
opinion against Turkey and 
establishing closer relations 
with the socialist countries in 
order to exert pressure on 
T u r k e y .
The Second Geneva Conference took place 
under very unfortunate circumstances. The 
Greeks felt so sure of support on the part of 
international public opinion that they adopted 
an inflexible attitude. Unfortunately, the 
British encouraged them. The Turkish 
government put its proposals on the table 
including a solution of a m u 1ticantona1 kind 
which was against Turkey's own interests and 
was not very logical because it would have led 
to friction on the island.
Ecevit was also encouraged to act 
assertively by Kissinger's reluctance to 
threaten the Turks in order to prevent the 
resumption of the offensive. Unlike US. 
President Lyndon Johnson who tried to 
intimidate Turkey with a number of undesirable 
eventualities, Kissinger only reasoned with 
Ecevit to discourage him. On 13 August 
Callaghan called Kissinger and told him that 
the Conference was about to break down.
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Kissinger replied: Let wait and see!
Kissinger later defended his unwillingness to
employ threats and especially the threat of an
arms embargo t o the Turks by
suggesting that;
The United States did not 
threaten Turkey for stopping
military aid for these reasons:
First, it was considered that 
such an action would be 
ineffective and would not 
prevent the threatening,
eventuality; Second, as pointed 
out in the above statement, we 
are giving economic and
military aid as a reflection of 
our common interest in the 
defense of the Eastern
Mediterranean. Once such a
decision is taken, it will have 
the most drastic consequences 
and not just over a period of 
time covering a few days but 
over an extended period of 
time. . . Short of this embargo 
threat however, we made the 
most repeated and urgent
representations to Turkey in 
order to prevent the military
action that happened. We have 
criticized the action, and we 
believe also that the
inflexibility of all the
parties in Geneva contributed 
to it.
Kissinger knew that Ecevit was not like his 
predecessors. He thought that any threat would 
accelerate Turkey's second operation. The best 
way to prevent Turkey's expansion, Kissinger 
believed, was to continuously assure the Turks 
that America considered their demands
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legitimate and that negotiations would sooner 
or later bring favorable results.
On August 1 3, 1 9 7 4 - one day before the
second operation, State Department Spokesman of 
America, Robert Anderson explained Kissinger's
policy, stating;
We recognize the position of 
the Turkish community on Cyprus 
requires considerable
improvement and protection. We 
have supported a greater degree 
of autonomy for them. The
parties in Geneva are
negotiating on one or more 
Turkish autonomous area. The
avenues of diplomacy have not 
been exhausted. And therefore 
the United States would
consider a resort to military 
action unjustified.
Ecevit was encouraged by the Soviets' 
silence to make the second defensive. The
Greek Cypriots were requesting military 
assistance from the Soviet Union, but the 
Soviets had refused even to respond. The last 
Greek Cypriot request came on 9 August 1 9 7 4, 
when Klerides told the Soviet observer at the 
Geneva Conference, Victor Menin, that the Greek 
Cypriots would welcome Soviet military
assistance if Turkey resumed its second 
offensive. Menin promised to inform his
superiors in Moscow, but the Soviets once again 
did not give any answer to the request.
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Moreover, the Greek side was not willing to 
compromise in the talks. News of genocide in 
Messaoria electrified the whole situation and 
so, on 14 August 1974, the second Turkish 
operation b e g a n . (4)
3 . 2 . 4 . HOT CRISIS: AUGUST 14 1974
After the break of the talks in Geneva, the 
"Second Peace Operation" started. Turkish 
Prime Minister explained the reasons which 
necessitated the second operation as follows;
Having reached the conclusion 
that there is no use but only 
harm in maintaining the 
appearance of continuing a 
conference that is being 
internationally obstructed and 
the deliberations of which are 
unilaterally violated, Turkey 
has considered it her duty to 
fulfill by herself her 
prerogatives and duties as a 
guarantor power, and her 
responsibilities concerning the 
independence of Cyprus as well 
as the rights and security of 
the Turkish Cypriot people.
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The action now undertaken by- 
Turkey is at least as rightful 
and legal as the action she 
started on 20 July as a 
guarantor power and strictly 
within the bounds of her 
authority as such a power, for 
the same conditions exist today 
as on the 20th July 
conditions that formed the 
basis of the rightfulness and 
legality of her action. This 
new Turkish action is as 
legitimate as Turkey's initial 
move and is its logical 
conclusion.(5)
By 16 August the Turkish forces had
captured the northern 36% of the island.
Following the cease-fire on 16 August 1974,
Turkey invited Greece and the Greek Cypriots to 
a new conference between the three guarantor 
powers and the representatives of the Greek and 
Turkish communities for a discussion on a final 
settlement of the Cyprus problem. Prime
Minister Ecevit reiterated that Turkey would be 
understanding and flexible on the revision of 
the demarcation line and would speed up the 
phased reduction of her forces. However,
Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected the
offer. ( 6)
Perhaps the most significant confirmation 
justifying Turkey's intervention came from 
Nicos Sampson himself. In an interview with 
the Athens newspaper 'Apoyevmatini ' on 15 July
49
1 9 7 5, the first anniversary of the coup, he 
disclosed that he was 'about to declare Enosis' 
when he was forced to quit the presidency. 
This illustrates the graveness of the threat to
the independence of Cyprus 
the coup and the danger of 
between Turkey and Greece.
Regarding the outcome of 
meeting, the Minority Rights 
30 of 1976 stated:
immediately after 
a full-scale war
the Second Geneva 
Group Report no.
Although not participating 
directly in the talks, the 
uncompromising spirit of 
Makarios weighed heavily over 
the Greek Cypriot delegation. 
Greece itself was in the throes 
of political convulsions 
following the removal of the 
Junta. There was little 
coordination, little awareness 
of Turkey's determination and 
the unfortunate overconfidence 
that somehow, unbelievably, the 
status quo could be restored.
mainly with pressure from
Britain and the United States.
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After the Second Operation 
important developments occurred 
in quick succession. The
United Nations Secretary-
General visited the island 
between 25-26 August 1974 and 
had consultations with the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides 
which resulted in the
commencement of bilateral talks 
in Nicosia between Mr. Rauf 
Denktash and Mr. Glafcos
Clerides. These talks were
conducted weekly in the
presence of the United Nations 
Secretary General's Special 
Representative in Cyprus and
dealt with humanitarian issues.
The release of Turkish and 
Greek prisoners of war, which 
began on 23 September 1 9 7 4 and 
was completed by the end of 
October 1 97 4, was a result of 
these m e e t i n g s . (7)
The continuation of the inner lines of the 
puzzle, described the background of the Cyprus 
conflict, and how it turned to be a crisis in 
1 974. Then, it explained the phases in the 
crisis period, namely; pre-crisis (July 15 
July 19, 1974) period, mid-crisis (July 20
July 24, 1974) period, cease-fire and Geneva
conferences (July 25 - August 13, 1974) period,
and hot crisis (August 14, 1974) period.
Within these descriptions, the interests and 
bargaining range, or limits, or offers has been 
underlined. In the following chapter, the
United Nations role as an intermediary party to 
resolve the 1974 crisis will be described.
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CHAPTER IV. EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS
4.1. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING 
THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS
The United Nations plays a crucial role in
international peace-making . The UN Security
Council has the primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security.
It has powers under Chapter V of the Charter,
to seek pacific settlement of disputes through 
investigation and by recommending appropriate 
procedures to the parties to the conflict. If
the parties fail to settle a dispute peacefully
themselves, they are obliged to refer it to the
Security Council, which may then recommend 
terms of a settlement.
On the other hand, it is not only the UN 
Security Council to bring to attention the 
international disputes to the agenda, but also, 
UN Secretary General has the power, under 
Article 99 of the Charter, to bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and
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security. Due to his status, and because he is 
independent of any government, the Secretary 
General, is in a unique position to be a 
peacemaker. The Secretary General, usually 
adopts his mission of good-offices , appointed 
to him by the UN Security Council, to resolve 
the c o n f l i c t s . (1)
The United Nations Secretary-Genera1, Kurt 
Waldheim, played the role of 'g ood-offices ' 
mission appointed to him, by the United Nations 
Security Council, during the 1974 Cyprus 
crisis. The Secretary-Genera1, carrying the 
good-offices mission, was there to establish a 
successful communication channel between the 
adversaries, in order to facilitate the 
qualified concessions from each adversary that 
would bring the crisis to a peaceful and long- 
lasting solution.
The situation in Cyprus, during the first 
half of 1974, remained relatively quiet. On 29 
May, the Security Council met to consider the 
situation in Cyprus. The representatives of 
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were invited, at 
their request, to participate in the discussion 
without the right to vote. At this meeting.
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the Security Council adopted the draft 
resolution No.349. By this resolution, the 
United Nations Security Council:
1. Urged the parties concerned to act with 
utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate 
determined cooperative efforts to achieve the 
Council's objectives by availing themselves in 
a constructive manner of the current auspicious 
climate and opportunities;
2. Extended once more the stationing in 
Cyprus of the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Force for a further period ending 15 December 
1974, in the expectation that by then 
sufficient progress towards a final solution 
would make possible a withdrawal or substantial 
reduction of the Force. (1)
The uneasiness in Cyprus was continuing 
since the 1960's. With such resolutions of the 
United Nations, the organization always 
stressed its interest in the Cyprus issue, in 
the means of providing peace on the world. The 
Cyprus conflict reached its peak with the 1974 
crisis. Besides, this was not regarded as a 
surprise by the United Nations. This 
expectation of such a crisis to emerge in 
Cyprus, led the United Nations Mission to pay
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importance to the strength and existence of the 
United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus.
The meeting on 29 May was also very 
important as it was the last meeting before the 
crisis erupted. At this meeting, the United 
Nations Mission was informed of the parties' 
preferences to the solution of the problem. 
These preferences broadly showed that the Greek 
side was offering a solution based on an 
independent, sovereign and unitary state. 
However, the Turkish side definitely perceived 
this proposal to lead towards Enosis -the 
annexation of Cyprus to Greece. This was the 
approach which required the end of the bi- 
communal structure of the state.
The Turkish side expressed that the 
Constitution of Cyprus was based on the concept 
of equality in law of the two communities, and 
consequently had a federalist spirit. (2) 
Therefore, the Turkish side was offering a 
solution based on an independent, sovereign and 
federative system for Cyprus. (3)
The adversary parties had offered two 
different solutions to end the conflict in 
which they put the definition of their 
interests on the island. The Turkish side's 
perception of a unitary state was based on
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Greece's efforts to reach Enosis. The concept 
of a unitary state is to mean that the majority 
would make laws and dictate it. In such a 
system, nothing would prevent the majority from 
opting for union with Greece. (4) And, this 
could never be an acceptable solution to the 
Turkish side. The Turkish government was 
trying to establish a balanced system in 
Cyprus, which would enable the Turks and· Greeks 
to cooperate and prosper under equitable 
conditions. (5)
On the 15th of July, the United Nations 
Secretary -G enera1 Kurt Waldheim, having 
received the information of a coup d'état in 
Cyprus, sent identical messages to the prime 
ministers of Greece and Turkey expressing his 
deep concern at the developments on the island, 
and stressing the importance of the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of 
Cyprus. (6) With this letter, the United 
Nations Secretary -G enera 1 formally started to 
act as the intermediary party between the 
adversaries. The Secretary -G enera1 attempted 
to establish individual communication links 
with each of the parties to the conflict. This 
would ascertain the reasons behind each parties 
involvement in the conflict.
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The Secretary-Genera1 was successful in 
getting acceptance from each party to the 
conflict as an intermediary. Each of the 
parties sent messages in reply to his letter 
stating they agreed that the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of 
Cyprus should be maintained. Although the 
Greek government's reply could be met with 
suspicion, the Turkish side was eager to solve 
this problem through negotiations. That was 
why, the Prime Minister of Turkey urged the 
United Nations to adopt certain initial 
measures immediately to prevent the further 
deterioration of the balance of forces and the 
illegal entry of military forces, weapons and 
ammunition into the i s l a n d . (7)
On 19 July, the Security Council, being 
informed of the developments in Cyprus by the 
Secretary-Genera1, adopted a draft resolution.
The Security Council;
1. called on all states to 
respect the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus;
2. demanded an immediate 
end to foreign military 
intervention in Cyprus and 
requested the withdrawal 
without delay of the foreign 
military personnel in excess of 
those envisaged in 
international agreements;
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3. requested all states to 
exercise the utmost restraint 
and to refrain from any action 
which might further aggravate 
the situation. (8)
The adaptation of these resolutions did not 
carry a strong sanction on the Greek Junta. 
The coup was still continuing. As a result, 
Turkey, who had performed remarkable restraint 
and patience in spite of immense internal 
pressures and humanitarian urge to act during 
the preceding eleven years, had no alternative 
but to intervene following the coup of 15 July 
1 9 7 4, and the assumption of Nicos Sampson to 
the Presidency. (9)
The crisis of 1974 was radically different 
from the earlier ones, because in 1974 the 
Cypriot independence and territorial integrity 
were being actively threatened, and the July 15 
coup was a manifestation of such a threat. 
Turkey correctly regarded the coup as 
tantamount to de facto Enosis and the Greek 
involvement as a breach of the sine qua non of 
the 1960 agreements, namely the prohibition of 
Enosis (and partition) as embodied in Article 
III of the Treaty of Guarantee. The coup
constituted an 'indirect attack' within the 
meaning of Article III of the Agreement for 
Application of the Treaty of Alliance. As
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11 was acting 
of the Cypriot 
integrity as
such, it was also a violation of both the 
Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. (10) In 
addition to this, the Greek action could be 
considered to be in violation of Article 2(4) 
of the United Nations Charter. (11)
Turkey launched its initial military 
invasion on July 20, 1974
within its right as a 
independence and 
defined under the Treaties of Guarantee and 
Alliance. (12) Furthermore, Turkey's right to 
unilateral action was only permissible under
the Treaty's terms in order to establish 'the
state of affairs created by the tr e a t y . ..' to 
maintain the status quo in Cyprus. This status 
quo certainly included the continuation and the
maintenance of the independence, territorial 
integrity and security of Cyprus as well as the
state of affairs which were created by the 
basic articles of the constitution. (13)
Following this development, the United 
Nations Security Council, which had met in 
emergency session, adopted Resolution No.353 
which, inter alia, called upon the three 
Guarantor Powers, Turkey, Greece, and the 
United Kingdom, 'to enter into negotiations 
without delay for the restoration of peace in
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1 nthe area and constitutional Government 
Cyprus' and 'having regard to the 
Agreements signed at Nicosia on August 16, 
1 9 6 0. ' With this Resolution, the Security
Council :
1. Called upon all States 
to respect the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus;
2. Called upon all parties
to the fighting as a first step 
to cease all firing and asked
all States to exercise the 
utmost restraint and to refrain 
from any action which might 
further aggravate the
situation;
3. Demanded an 
end to foreign
intervention in Cyprus 
in contravention
imme d i a t e 
military 
that was 
of its
sovereignty independence
integrity;
and
4. Requested the withdrawal 
without delay from the Republic 
of Cyprus of foreign military 
personnel present otherwise 
then under the authority of 
international agreements , 
including those whose 
withdrawal was requested by the 
President of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, on 
2 July 1974;
5. Called on Greece, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom to enter 
into negotiations without delay 
for the restoration of peace in 
the area and constitutional 
government in Cyprus and to 
keep the Secretary-Genera1 
informed;
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6. Called on all parties to 
cooperate fully with UNFICYP to 
enable it to carry out its 
mandate; and
7. Decided to keep the 
situation under constant review 
and asked the Secretary-Genera 1 
to report as appropriate with a 
view adopting further measures 
in order to ensure that 
peaceful conditions were 
restored as soon as possible.
( 14 )
The United Nations Mission, establishing 
individual communication links between the 
parties to the conflict, was attempting to r e ­
establish tri-lateral communication links 
between the parties to the conflict and itself. 
There, the United Nations Mission agreed that 
this could only be achieved if a cease-fire 
between the adversaries was reached. So, this 
had been the first and major initial step that 
the United Nations took as an intermediary as 
to assess sanction on the parties.
However, fighting on the island had 
intensified the' next day. The Secretary- 
General appealed to all concerned to bring 
fighting to an immediate end, and begin 
negotiations for a peaceful settlement in line 
with the Security Council's resolution of the 
previous day. Also, the Secretary-Genera1 
addressed appeals to the prime ministers of
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Greece and Turkey, expressing his deep concern 
at the continued savage fighting, and appealed 
for an urgent and positive response to the 
Council's resolution of 20 July. (15)
Resolution 353 was the main instrument that 
the United Nations Mission had formulated to 
end the dispute as quick as possible, and had 
mandated the Secretary-General to ensure a 
communication channel between the adversaries. 
The adversaries, Turkey and Greece, said that 
they agree that without a cease-fire, 
negotiations could not start, and they would be 
willing to a cease-fire if the necessary 
conditions had been reached.
In response to this development, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
N o . 354. With this Resolution, the Security 
Council demanded that all parties to the 
fighting comply immediately with the provision 
of resolution 3 53 by which the Council had 
called for an immediate cessation of all firing 
in the area, and had requested all states to 
exercise the utmost restraint and refrain from 
any action which might further aggravate the 
situation. (16) On 22 July 1 97 4, both Turkey 
and Greece announced that they would abide by
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the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
353, calling for a cease-fire in Cyprus.
The United States Administration
facilitated the Turco-Greek agreement to adopt 
a cease-fire by providing a face-saving 
formula, ensuring that both parties would 
announce their adoption of a truce at the same
time. The United Nations Administration had
played a significant role within the United 
Nations Mission, being a member of the Security
Council. The United States proposed that peace 
talks should begin as soon as possible after
the fighting had ceased on the island. On the
other hand, the United Nations Mission knew 
that it was impossible to cease the fighting 
all over the island. One of the causes of that 
was the insufficiency of the UNFICYP. The
United Nations Administration played a
in convincing Greece and 
to an agreement to end
role
Turkey to come 
hostilities. (17) 
As ment i oned in the previous chapter, 
during the time of tempting the parties to 
cease all firing activities on the island, the
Greek junta stepped down and turned political
power over to a civilian cabinet to be formed
under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis.
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In Cyprus, the Sampson junta also fell on 23 
July 1974. Glafkos Klerides, the President of 
the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, was 
sworn in the same day as President of the 
Republic of Cyprus. (18)
The first Geneva Conference began on 25 
July 1 9 7 4, only two days after the return of 
democratic rule to Greece. Turkey, Greece and 
Britain were represented by their Foreign 
Ministers at the Conference.
Geneva Conferences had started only after 
reaching a partial cease-fire on the island. 
The Geneva Conferences meant that the United 
Nations Mission was successful in establishing 
individual communication links between the 
parties to the conflict. As a result, this was 
followed by the attempts of the United Nations 
Mission to re-establish tri-lateral 
communication links between the adversaries and 
itself to facilitate qualified concessions from 
each party.
Greece's first priority at the conference 
was to stop Turkey's expansion on Cyprus which 
continued low scale after the 22 July cease­
fire. (19) Greek forces, on the other hand, 
went on occupying additional Turkish enclaves 
on other parts of the island. By the end of
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July, the "National Guard" occupied 198 Turkish 
villages containing 35,882 Turkish Cypriots and 
surrounded an additional 21,157 people in 60 
villages. (20) Turkish sectors in larger towns 
were also raided and thousands of Turkish males 
were taken hostage. (21)
The Foreign Minister of Greece announced on 
26 July 1974 that unless Turkey agreed to 
withdraw its forces to the 22 July cease-fire 
boundaries, Greece would abandon the 
conference. Turkish Foreign Minister responded 
by indicating that "unless the cease-fire is 
accepted by everybody in all parts of the 
island. . . I can assume no responsibility on 
behalf of the Turkish forces on Cyprus." (22)
On 27 July 1 9 7 4, following these 
developments, the negotiations reached an 
impasse over the issue of the violations of the 
22 July cease-fire. The Security Council met 
again to consider the situation on the island. 
The Secretary-Genera1 informed the Council that 
there had been a series of breaches of the 
cease-fire (23) , and that increased their 
concern about the resumption of fighting again. 
It was observed that the United Nations Peace 
Keeping Force in Cyprus was not efficient 
enough to provide the cease-fire on the island
65
and that was why the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a 1 asked 
the contributing countries to further
strengthen the Force. Besides mentioning the 
insufficiency of the United Nations Peace 
Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) , he asked at
the tripartite talks then under way in Geneva
between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom to discuss how best 
UNFICYP could actively assist in limiting 
further hostilities and cease-fire violations.
(24) This was one sign of the reasons behind 
the failure of the United Nations Mission in
1 9 7 4.
At this stage, The United States, which was
to play an efficient role in the crisis, 
intervened. The Secretary of State Kissinger 
called both Ecevit and Karamanlis. Within one 
day, Kissinger succeeded in persuading both 
parties to adopt a new cease-fire line, which
acknowledged the respective expansions of both 
Greek and Turkish forces. (25)
Except for its recognition of Resolution 
353, Turkey made no compromises in Geneva. The
same was not true for Greece. The Greek
foreign minister opposed some of the Turkish 
demands, but eventually accepted most of them.
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The Geneva Declaration, signed on 30 July- 
1974 by the foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey 
and Britain linked Turkey's withdrawal of its 
forces from Cyprus to the achievement of "a 
just and lasting solution acceptable to all 
parties concerned." (26) The agreement
reached, inter alia, that:
1. a security zone should 
be set u p ;
2. all Turkish Cypriot 
enclaves occupied by Greek or 
Greek Cypriot forces should be 
immediately evacuated;
3. detained military 
personnel and civilians should 
be exchanged or released;
4. negotiations should be 
carried on to secure the 
restoration of peace in the 
area and to re-establish 
constitutional government in 
C y p r u s .
The three foreign ministers also noted in 
the Declaration 'the existence in practice in 
the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous 
administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot 
community and that of the Turkish Cypriot 
community' . (27) Britain and Greece, thus lent 
their recognition to the military presence of 
Turkey on Cyprus. They also acknowledged that 
Turkey had a legitimate right to occupy part of
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the island until such time when a new 
constitutional order was established.
The Geneva Declaration also bestowed 
credence on Turkey's argument that the 1960 
constitution no longer suited the concept of 
peaceful coexistence between the two
communities by calling for a "just and lasting
solution acceptable to all parties concerned. "
The Declaration did not refer to the "Cypriot
State" as much, but to the "representatives of
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
Communities." It also conferred legitimacy on 
the Turkish Cypriot Administration which had 
existed on the island since 1964 by noting "the
existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus
of two autonomous administrations - that of
the Greek Cypriot community and that of the 
Turkish Cypriot c ommun i t y . " (28)
They also agreed that further talks aiming
at restoration of peace should begin on 8 
August 1974 at Geneva, and that the 
representatives of the two Cypriot communities 
should be invited at an early stage to 
participate in the talks regarding the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The Secretary-General expressed the hope 
that the agreement reached in Geneva on the
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cease-fire would be a first step towards the 
full implementation of the Council's resolution 
of 20 July. And, he added that to reach this 
settlement, he was prepared to cooperate fully 
with the parties. (29) Moreover, in the light 
of the appropriate action, an amendment was 
introduced to the operative paragraph of 
Resolution 353. The amendment stated that the 
Council was "taking into account that the 
cease-fire will be the first step in the full 
implementation of the Security Council 
resolution 353 (1974) ."
When the Security Council met on 1 August, 
following the developments, it adopted 
Resolution No.355. According to this 
resolution, the Security Council recalled some 
of its previous decisions on the Cyprus 
question;
1. It noted that all states 
had declared their respect for 
the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of 
C y p r u s .
2. It also requested the 
Secretary-Genera1 to take 
appropriate action in light of 
his statement and to present a 
full report to the Council, 
taking into account that the 
cease-fire would be the first 
step in the full implementation 
of the Council resolution 353 
( 1 9 7 4 ) of 2 0 July . (30)
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The Secretary-General reported on 9 August 
that although some progress had been achieved 
towards bringing peace to Cyprus, the cease­
fire was not yet secure in all parts of the 
island, despite the efforts of the United 
Nations, of interested governments and of the 
parties directly concerned. The Second Geneva 
Conference was held from 9 to 13 August 1974.
During the period between the First and 
Second Geneva Conferences, the Greek and Greek 
Cypriot side, far from complying with the 
agreements reached at the First Geneva 
Conference, for example, to evacuate the 
Turkish enclaves and to establish a security 
zone, continued to attack Turkish Cypriot 
habitations and to take hundreds of Turkish 
Cypriots as prisoners. Turkish Cypriots had to 
evacuate another thirty-three villages and 
those living in the south were put under an 
inhuman siege while atrocities were being 
continued against Turkish villages, where 
almost whole populations were massacred and 
wiped out. (31) There was an established
emotional hatred as a cause of these atrocities 
since 1960. The insufficiency of the UNFICYP 
led to the failure of the United Nations 
Mission to eliminate this fact. And without
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proving the power of the United Nations on the 
island, it was almost impossible for it to 
appear effective to the parties to the 
conflict .
One week before the start of the Second 
Geneva Conference, Ecevit, as noted at the 
beginning of the discussion, favored a 
territorial federation to resolve the problem 
in Cyprus. However, this was not an acceptable 
solution to the Greek side. They stated that; 
"the idea of federation is not feasible. We 
live on geographically homogenous territories. 
This would imply the transfer of tens of 
thousands of people." Instead, they favored a 
unitary state which granted "local autonomy" to 
Turkish Cypriots. (32) As will be seen, the 
reluctance of Greek Cypriots to consider a 
settlement based on a territorial federation, 
and the failure of the United Nations Mission 
to establish a successful bargaining range, led 
to Turkey's second operation.
The Ecevit government had concluded that at 
the Second Geneva Conference, Turkey should 
insist on the negotiation of a new Cyprus 
settlement, preferably a bi-zonal federation. 
The government also decided that if the Greeks 
refused to accept the principle of a federative
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solution, and procrastinated the Turkish 
delegation should withdraw from the conference, 
and Turkey should achieve its goal by resuming 
its offensive in Cyprus. (33)
When the conference was resumed on 9 
August, the Turkish foreign minister stated 
that the Greek forces had not yet evacuated the 
Turkish enclaves. Greek Foreign Minister 
replied that Turkey, too, violated the Geneva 
Declaration by extending its zone of occupation 
by thirty square kilometers. (34)
It is also important to note the 
confrontational attitude of the Greek foreign 
minister at the second conference. The Turkish 
representatives at the first Geneva Conference 
perceived him as "reserved and undecided", at 
the second conference they saw him as 
"uncompromising". (35) Only one day after the 
first conference, the Greek foreign minister 
stated that during the upcoming conference in 
Geneva, Greece and Turkey should "seek a 
solution to the Cyprus issue acceptable to both 
c ommun i t i e s . " ( 3 6 ) On 11 August he reversed 
himself and argued that "the guarantor powers 
do not have the right to impose a new 
constitution on C y p r u s . " (37)
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On the second day of the conference, the 
positions of the Turkish and Greek delegations 
were underlined once more. Klerides offered 
the position of vice-president to Denktash and 
a return to the 1960 constitution. Denktash 
replied that;
For eleven years, the Greeks 
have tried, and did all they 
could, to destroy the 1960 
constitution. Now we are 
invited to go back to the 1960 
constitution. This is 
impossible; that constitution 
did not save the Turks, did not 
save Cyprus, has given us no 
protection. (38)
On 10 August 1 974, the second day of the 
conference, Rauf Denktash submitted the 
T u r k i s h -Turkish Cypriot settlement proposal to 
British Foreign Secretary Callaghan who 
transmitted it privately to the Greek and Greek 
Cypriot delegations.(39) The Turkish proposal 
offered the establishment of a bi-zonal federal 
state that would provide a great deal of 
autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek 
delegation almost immediately rejected the 
proposal. Both the proposal and its rejection 
were informal, and took place not in plenary 
sessions, but in private meeting r o o m s . (40)
Then, the United States intervened once 
more. Kissinger called Ecevit. He said that
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they understood the Turkish Cypriots' need for 
more territory and for more autonomy. He said 
that these goals should be accomplished through 
negotiations. During the telephone 
conversation which took place on 12 August 
1974, Kissinger perceived that Klerides would 
be more willing to accept a cantonal rather 
than a federal settlement on C y p r u s . (41) 
However, the cantonal plan was not popular with 
the Turkish side who believed that the six 
Turkish cantons around six major Cypriot towns 
would still leave Turkish Cypriots vulnerable 
to Greek a t t a c k s . (42)
Meanwhile, breaches of the cease-fire was 
observed and the Security Council met at as 
emergency session on 14 August 1974, once 
again. Reports concerning the renewed fighting 
before and during the Geneva Conferences in 
Cyprus was forwarded to the Security Council. 
Based on this development, the Security Council
adopted Resolution No. 357;
1. reaffirmed that 
resolution in all its 
provisions and called upon the 
parties to implement them 
without delay;
2 . demanded that all 
parties to the fighting cease 
all firing and military actions 
forthwith;
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3. called for the 
resumption of negotiations 
without delay for the 
restoration of peace in the 
area and constitutional 
government in Cyprus in 
accordance with resolution 353 
(1974); and
4. decided to remain seized 
of the situation and on instant 
call to meet as necessary to 
consider what more effective 
measures might be required if 
the cease-fire was not 
respected. (43)
At Geneva, it was observed that the 
negotiations were coming closer to a deadlock. 
The Turkish representative had presented a 
proposal, with a deadline for its acceptance, 
calling for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot 
zone covering 34 percent of the island.
This was a signal that the Turkish side was 
not satisfied with the United Nations Mission 
to facilitate concessions from each party that 
was to the benefit of the two sides. As a 
matter of fact, when the Acting President of 
Cyprus had asked for an extension of the 
deadline, it was not accepted. (44)
The Greek side was claiming that the 
Turkish side did not respect the first cease-
fire, and extended its Turki sh held t e r r i t o r y .
They also claimed that Turkey did not have a
legal right to intervene in the affairs of
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Cyprus, where in fact they used the term 
'invade' rather than 'intervene'. They claimed 
that no sovereign, independent state could 
accept proposals made at gun point from an 
outside c o u n t r y . (45)
The Turkish side's reply was very clear.
They said that both sides interpreted the 
Geneva Declaration differently. The concept of 
autonomy no longer seemed to be accepted. 
Turkey had asked for 34 percent of Cyprus as a
basis for establishing an autonomous
administration for the Turkish Cypriots, since 
they had owned at least that much territory 
before they had been dispossessed on their land 
during the past 10 years. The reason for
failure in Geneva, however, was the Greek 
refusal to recognize that the Turkish Cypriots 
had been and should remain masters of their 
island to the same degree as the Greeks. 
However, for the Turkish Cypriots everything 
was conceivable as long as they participated 
under conditions of equality and security. (46) 
By the end of 13 August 1 9 7 4, the Turks 
became convinced that the continuation of the 
negotiations would bring no favorable results 
and that the second operation, which from the
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beginning had been considered an integral part 
of the Turkish strategy would be d o n e . (47)
Just before the beginning of the second 
operation, Kissinger forced Ecevit to offer a
' 1 a s t -a 11 e r n a t i v e ' . Ecevit demanded the
demilitarization of the area around the Turkish 
forces which occupied seven percent of the 
territory. After this evacuation Turkey would
extend its control toward Famagusta on the 
eastern shore, thus seizing 17 - 18 percent of
the island's territory. (48) Ecevit told
Kissinger that if the Greeks accepted this 
"interim" solution, he would postpone the 
negotiations not only for forty eight hours, 
but for several weeks. Kissinger, however,
failed to persuade the Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots to accept this suggestion. (49)
On 14 August, the Security Council adopted
the draft Resolution No.358 in response to
these developments. The
1. recalled its 
1974 resolutions; and
C o u n c i l  ; 
earlier
2. insisted on their full 
implementation by all parties 
and on the immediate and strict 
observance of the cease-fire.
( 50 )
The Security Council then adopted the 
second draft Resolution No.359. With this
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Resolution, the Security Council noted with 
concern that casualties were increasing among 
the personnel of UNFICYP and recalled that 
UNFICYP was stationed in Cyprus with the full 
consent of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. It also 
recalled that the Secretary General had been 
requested by the Council, in its resolution 
355(1974) of 1 August, to take appropriate 
action in light of his statement, in which he 
had dealt with the role, functions and strength 
of UNFICYP and related issues. (51)
On 14 August 1974 the second phase of 
Turkey's Cyprus operation started. It only 
lasted two more days, ending on 16 August 1974 
and captured 36 percent of the island. (52)
The Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's 
statements after the second offensive suggest 
that he believed that Greeks and Greek Cypriots 
would soon return to the negotiating table in 
Geneva, and that Turkey would exploit its 
improved position in Cyprus to achieve a 
favorable settlement. (53) In fact, a new 
series of these talks were initiated in 1975 
under the auspices of the United Nations 
Secretary General.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
The thesis focused on the 1974 Cyprus 
crisis, in two main chapters. One was to 
evaluate the crisis according to the "crisis 
management" literature, and the other was to 
evaluate the role of the United Nations 
Secretary General according to the "mediator" 
literature, within the framework of "Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution" literature.
The thesis tries to find the answer of the 
question as to how the UN Secretary General 
played his role of good-offices mission during 
the crisis to resolve it. His task in his 
mission was to re-establish the broken 
communication between the adversaries and 
determine their bargaining ranges as to one 
another. Then, his task should be to provide 
grounds to put these bargaining issues and the 
ones which are out of the bargaining range on a 
negotiation table in order to lead a settlement 
by negotiation.
In fact, the issues which are kept 
outside the bargaining range, are the ones to
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determine the resolution of the conflict. If 
these issues, in one way or another, can be put 
on the negotiation table acceptable to the 
adversaries, then a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict might occur. In the Cyprus case, the 
desire of the Greeks to reach 'enosis' has 
always been kept outside the bargaining·. That 
is, they never sat on a negotiation table to 
discuss the real conflicting matters. 
Resolution of the conflict was simple from 
their point of view. Their aim was to reach a 
unitary state, which is independent and 
sovereign, but only abling the Turks to have 
"local auto n o m y " .
However, such an expectation is 
perceived by the Turkish side, to annex Cyprus 
to Greece, which means 'enosis'. 'Enosis' has 
never become an acceptable idea to be discussed 
on a negotiation table from the Turkish point 
of view. The Turkish side's offer was also 
very clear. They were asking for a sovereign, 
independent and federal state. So a federal 
state would save the rights of all the Turkish 
Cypriots living on the island, and they would 
save their 'self-determination' right.
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As, it has been read in the previous 
chapters that the Secretary General did not 
have the enough leverage to put these terms on
the negotiation table to be discussed. Even 
UNFICYP was not successful to provide peace 
during cease-fire time. So, this lack of
leverage, ended by the Turkish intervention to 
the island to secure the "self-determination" 
right of the Turkish Cypriots living on the 
island; or, UN Secretary General was being 
aware of the situation, lost his ob j e c t i v e n e s s 
and could not act to insist to discuss "self-
determination" right and "enosis" on the 
negotiation tables.
the end of the 
by establishing
The crisis ended by 
"second peace-operation",
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the %36 
of the island.
Today, the conflict still continues to 
be a part of the international agenda. And,
still there is no concrete step taken to 
discuss the terms "enosis" and "self- 
determination" on the negotiation tables. As
these terms can not be discussed openly, no 
further step to end the conflict could seem 
probable. However, nowadays, as the question
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came to the agenda by the membership of the 
G r e e k -Cypriot side to the European Union, it 
has been started to discuss a resolution based 
on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. In
fact, such a solution is not different from 
what Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit offered in 
the 1 9 7 4 Cyprus crisis. So, this shows that, 
in the past 32 years, the core of the conflict 
remained the same.
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